Military Intelligence Program - DIA manages certain intelligence activities across the department. Its National Military Intelligence Collection Center confirms this need for intelligence requirements set by Defense customers. DIA also sets overall priorities for gathering intelligence from national systems to meet military needs.
In war or crisis, the authority to complete these national systems passes to the Secretary of Defense, and DIA acts as the focal point for the task. DIA also manages the Defense Attaché System and recently created the Defense HUMINT Service, and coordinates intelligence analysis and production between the military departments and the Unified Command.
Military Intelligence Program
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization has taken a more active role in intelligence affairs in recent years. This is partly the result of the new roles assigned to the President, JCS, by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and partly the increasing role of "national" intelligence systems (ie, satellite imagery and
An Intelligence Systems Architect
SIGINT systems) play in supporting military operations. To assist in the preparation of the President's annual recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on the allocation of resources, SPK has established a process that examines how intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities contribute to joint warfare
. Finally, DIA fills several key roles in the Intelligence Community. Its director is responsible for establishing a consolidation of the budget for defense "general" intelligence activities in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and administers the office that oversees the collection of intelligence for this purpose to obtain measures and data of
other physics (MASINT). No matter how effective the collection and analysis, intelligence is useless if it does not reach military commanders in a form they can use and when they need it. It is therefore imperative that intelligence support for military operations be synchronized with global command, control and communications systems.
The channels of dissemination for the intelligence must be compatible with the information systems of the forces, which allow the intelligence to be assimilated immediately for use in the targeting and delivery of precision weapons. DIA is the largest analytical organization, originally created to consolidate the separate analytical efforts of the military departments on general military topics.
Clandestine Humint Operations
Analytical components from military departments are expected to provide intelligence support for acquisition and training, particularly the scientific and technical expertise needed to meet the unique needs of their respective departments. Each service, in fact, maintains a large intelligence element to provide that service-specific analytical support.2 Large analytical elements also exist in the Joint Intelligence Centers of each Unified Command that provide appropriate analysis to the CINC in its theater.
of operations. Smaller analytical elements still exist in subordinate commands in theaters. Intelligence gathering through human resources (HUMINT) has been done by elements of military intelligence throughout its history. Recently, military HUMINT activities have included an overt collection of information from military personnel, such as attachments;
gathering from separate elements before the deployment of US military forces; and, finally, the clandestine recruitment of human resources by military personnel. Prior to 1995, this latter aspect of HUMINT collection was done on a limited scale by intelligence elements within each military department.
Army intelligence was more involved, with Air Force and Navy intelligence participating to a lesser degree. During crises and other contingencies involving the deployment or potential deployment of US forces, the J-2 facilitates the flow of intelligence to CINCs and joint task forces by ensuring that collectors and
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Possible Organizational Improvements
producers at the national level respond to the needs of their operatives. During Desert Storm and subsequent deployments of US forces, he also served as the Director of Intelligence Spokesman for the President, JCS, providing assessments to the press and/or congressional committees as needed.
. We found that military intelligence has not lost its focus on providing the best possible support to soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who may be placed in harm's way. we also discovered that military commanders have become more knowledgeable about national and tactical intelligence capabilities, and are more intent on integrating these capabilities into all phases of their operations.
Technical advances in computing and communication have made such integration possible. The ultimate responsibility for operational control of the military forces rests with the president and the secretary of defense who receive advice and assistance from the joint chiefs of staff.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council.1 While
Director For Intelligence J- The Joint Staff
the KINCs are directly responsible to the secretary for conducting military operations, the president of the KPS is responsible, together with the CINCs, for the development of military plans, strategies and doctrines to govern the joint war, and to make resource recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense involving joint warfare capabilities. The military services retain their responsibility to "organize, train and equip" their forces, including those that make up the Unified Command. With responsibility for military intelligence distributed among the staff of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the JCS, the Unified Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other national intelligence components located within the Department of
the Defense (for example, the National Defense Intelligence Agency). Security, Central Images Office), it is not surprising that a variety of joint programs and other types of hybrid management arrangements have been created to accommodate the action involved.
A number of boards, working groups, commissions and review groups have also been established to coordinate intelligence activities. Some, such as the military's Intelligence Board, an informal committee made up of representatives of key intelligence elements, appear to play a valuable coordinating role.
Dod Organization And Mission
In other cases, the multitude of coordination mechanisms seems to hinder progress. The Commission's recommendation will change the responsibilities of the DIA Director. That agency focuses on the production and management of long-range military intelligence analysis, supporting the intelligence needs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (including providing current intelligence
), and the management of other defense-wide military intelligence functions. DIA continued to provide actual intelligence support to the J-2 and provide staff support to the Joint National Military Intelligence Center, but no longer performed Joint Staff functions.
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Its Director will continue to report to the Secretary of Defense and, as head of a combat support agency, to the President, JCS. 2 Element of the Army is the National Ground Intelligence Center; the Navy element, the National Center for Naval Intelligence;
Air Force Element, Air National Intelligence Center; and the Marine Corps element, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. 10-3. The commission recommends the appointment of a single systems architect whose role spans intelligence, surveillance and C3, and who coordinates closely with weapons system designers to achieve a more coherent approach to this critical set of
problems It is clear that the United States needs human intelligence for foreign military forces. Because of their specialized knowledge, military personnel are important to this effort. Few current CIA HUMINT collectors have significant military experience.
At the same time, the army faces a number of practical problems in mounting these types of operations. It is difficult to maintain a professional cadre of collectors because military officers spend only a few years at a time on HUMINT assignments and then must return to their careers to be eligible for promotion.
HUMINT operations also require a large and complex infrastructure from which to operate, including overseas offices, cover legends, and specialized training. DIA has made significant progress toward reducing duplication in military analysis and production, long seen as a substantial problem.
Its National Military Intelligence Production Center assigns responsibility for analysis to analytical components in the military services and Joint Intelligence Centers, and then monitors production to prevent overlap. However, problems in military analysis and production remain.
Reflecting the changes brought about in the SPK and the Joint Staff by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, J-2 took on a greater role in developing intelligence doctrine and "architectures" to ensure that national and tactical intelligence capabilities can
be used effectively to support responsibilities. of each CINC. He also has primary responsibility for the intelligence aspects of the President's annual report to the Secretary on defense capabilities. Through a Joint Requirements Working Group, the SPK Oversight Board, J-2 makes recommendations to the President on the capabilities and resources proposed for national and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities funded by
the Defense budget. While DIA continues to provide the bulk of staff support for these functions, the J-2 is clearly tasked with performing Joint Staff duties beyond the provision of actual intelligence. Adoption of this recommendation should provide limited cost savings, but cost savings is not the primary reason for recommending the reorganization of functions.
Rather, the Commission believes it is more consistent with the respective roles and comparative advantages of the CIA and the military. The responsibilities of ASD (C3I) are closer to covering the various aspects of the architecture problem.
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He is responsible to the Secretary for the general supervision of intelligence and C3. While the office is not responsible for weapons system design, it is well positioned to influence such coordination. Any action recommended by this office should also be closely coordinated with the JCS to ensure compliance with military operational requirements and recommendations developed for the president by the Joint Requirements Oversight Board, as well as with service acquisition elements
military and agencies. of protection. In this way, the Secretary of Defense will be presented with consistent recommendations regarding the acquisition of intelligence systems, communications and weapons to better meet the needs of common warfare. Throughout its history, the United States has maintained an intelligence capability primarily to meet the needs of its military.
These needs were and are today, extensive and essential. They include information about the size, capabilities, location, disposition and plans of foreign military forces, as well as information about foreign countries and events in foreign countries necessary to plan and conduct military operations.
In each of the Unified Commands, there are ongoing activities comparable to those carried out at the national level. The command intelligence officer ("J-2") is responsible for developing plans, programs, and architectures to ensure that intelligence capabilities are available, interoperable, and can be used in support of joint operations.
Successfully utilizing a concept employed during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) were established within each command to serve as the focal point for the employment of national and tactical intelligence collectors. JICs also provide analysis tailored to the needs of the CINC, its staff, and subordinate commanders.
Some of the Commission's interviewees, including several military officers, called for the clandestine HUMINT operations of the military services (and now the Defense HUMINT Service) to be discontinued and left entirely to the CIA. They argued that over the years, such activities have produced little value and are difficult for the military to carry out.
They argue that the cost of maintaining a separate infrastructure to conduct clandestine HUMINT operations is simply not justified by the limited results. The commission found no less than new offices or boards in the DoD that claimed responsibility for handling all or part of this "architectural" problem.
Some have focused on the intelligence side, some on the communication side, and others from the perspective of the tactical user. The impression is one of less of a coherent and unified effort. Essential analytical support for the Secretary, his staff, and the Unified Command is provided primarily by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), whose director is appointed by the Secretary and reports to the Secretary.
DIA was created in 1961 to provide current intelligence to the entire DoD, consolidate analysis on general military topics conducted by each of the military departments, coordinate the DoD's contribution to national intelligence assessments , confirm the intelligence needs of DoD components, and coordinate the provision of common components.
functions. Over the years, however, DIA's responsibilities gradually expanded. In October 1995, to reduce the cost of four separate military HUMINT organizations and to improve coordination, the operations of the elements of the military services were combined under the newly created Defense HUMINT Service, managed by the Intelligence Agency
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of Defense. It is reported that 80 percent of the work of the new service is dedicated to open collection, for example, the collection of publicly available information, attendance at scientific and professional conferences, and interviews of people who
they had access to information of interest, and 20 percent for the development of clandestine human beings. resources. Such operations are carried out by specially trained military personnel and coordinated with the CIA. Under this arrangement, the J-2 clearly remains dependent on DIA support.
(Indeed, the Commission does not foresee any reduction in such support.) It is also important that the J-2 does not duplicate the functions of DIA by maintaining analytical capabilities beyond what is necessary to fulfill its responsibilities to support military operations.
The Commission leaves the matter regarding the rank and status of the affected officials to the Defense Secretary and the Chairman, KPSK. The Department of Defense (DoD) was created by law in 1949. It includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, 16 "defense agencies" that are created by the Secretary of
the Defense to be carried out. specific functions, and nine "Unified Commands" responsible for conducting military operations. As mentioned above, there is no staff officer in the Joint Staff who manages intelligence. The officer serving in this capacity (ie, as a "J-2") is assigned to DIA and reports to the Chairman, JCS as a de facto member of the Joint Staff (as the
Director of DIA). Its director's job is to provide current intelligence support (that is, information on developments that may affect US military interests and intelligence support for ongoing military operations) to the JCS and CINC. In this capacity, the J-2 manages the National Joint Military Intelligence Center at the Pentagon, staffed by DIA staff and representatives from other agencies, as well as the DoD's global warning and indication system.
The Defense HUMINT Service shall be responsible for the Defense Attachment System and the open collection of information for military customers. This recommendation is also not intended to affect clandestine HUMINT activities undertaken by DoD elements in advance of or as part of a military operation.
The Secretary of Defense exercises direction and control over all elements of the Department. It has responsibility for establishing policy, allocating resources, and monitoring compliance with policy and resource decisions, as well as functioning in the chain of command for military operations.
The Office of the Secretary contains numerous elements of the staff under the civilian leaders who assist the Secretary in the performance of his responsibilities in particular functional areas. A variety of intelligence organizations help meet these needs.
The production of military intelligence analysis is primarily the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the intelligence elements of the military services and the Unified Command, and organic tactical intelligence units at the fighting forces.
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Other intelligence organizations (for example, the National Security Agency, the Central Imagery Office and the Central Intelligence Agency) also make important contributions to provide support to current operations. The Director of ASD also reports to the President, JCS, both in his capacity as head of a "combat support agency" and as the President's chief intelligence advisor.
Because there is no intelligence staff officer on the Joint Staff per se, the Director of ASD performs this function, delegating day-to-day responsibility to a subordinate officer whose title is "Director of Intelligence, J- 2". This officer supports the president, the JCS, the joint staff, and the secretary with current global intelligence on situations that may require US military involvement.
DIA also provides intelligence support to military departments by producing independent assessments of foreign military capabilities that assist the departments—which also make such assessments—in organizing, training, and equipping their forces. Today, the ASD supports the Secretary and his staff by providing critical intelligence support for the execution of many of his key functions, from decisions regarding the use of military force to major procurement decisions and
their relations with foreign counterparts. The Commission does not oppose the need for the analysis of these organizations. Each seems to serve a legitimate function. However, the Commission is concerned about the large size of these organizations and what appears to be a tendency for them to exceed their core missions.
The dividing line between DIA's analytical responsibilities and those of the military departments remains blurred despite the agreed production process described above. The commission also found during its visits to overseas commands that some analytical elements were collecting and analyzing information on political and economic topics that seemed above the scope of their missions.
10-2. The committee recommends that the J-2 become part of the Joint Staff, instead of continuing to be part of DIA with responsibility to both organizations. The J-2 should continue to provide current intelligence to the President, JCS, and CINC (using support from DIA instead of creating a separate staff organization for this purpose), operate the National Joint Military Intelligence Center, and execute
SPK specific functions (eg. , doctrine, review of theater architectures, CINC liaison, capability assessments, resource recognition) within the framework of the Staff Council. The J-2 must have its own personnel, commensurate with joint staffing and resource levels, to perform these duties.
Together, these organizations provide a wide range of support. They advise defense policymakers on politico-military issues, major procurement and force planning. They provide threat forecasts that guide the military services on how best to "organize, train and equip" their forces and warn of potential crises.
Finally, they support the employment of armed forces in a wide continuum of operations, from disaster relief, to peacekeeping, to combat operations. The primary consumers of such information are the US military, the military departments, the secretary of defense, and the president, but those responsible for foreign policy often need such information as well.
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